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1 Introduction
Byzantine-fault tolerant (BFT) distributed consensus is a key enabler for many distributed systems including
distributed databases and blockchains [3]. Existing BFT consensus algorithms have poor scalability due the
need for all-to-all communication between participants. Thus, if there is a need for high transaction rate, BFT
consensus must be carried out only between a small number of participants, with the additional requirements
that these participants be geographically close, to mitigate latency from speed-of-light propagation delays.
The key idea in this work is to group participants into multiple geographically-close Byzantine Fault
Tolerant groups (BGs). Assuming that each BG is fault tolerant, they can achieve consensus relatively
quickly and in parallel. Then, the results from these groups can be merged using an globally-distributed crash
fault-tolerant consensus protocol, such as the recently proposed Canopus [12] scalable consensus protocol,
which uses pipelining, batching, and communication on a tree-like overlay network to achieve very high
throughput in a geo-distributed setting.
In this paper, we describe RCanopus (‘resilent Canopus’) which can be viewed as extending Canopus
to add liveness, that is, to recover from failure despite using unreliable failure detectors, and to tolerate
Byzantine attacks. It guarantees safety even in the presence of Byzantine attacks and network partitioning.
Our design relies on several key ideas:
• Nodes are geographically grouped. The first level of nodes are grouped by server rack into superleafs
(SLs), allowing fast intra-group communication. At the second level, nodes from SLs in each geograph-
ical region form a Byzantine Group (BG). Finally, BGs are hierachically clustered and execute the
Canopus protocol in parallel.
• BGs let RCanopus achieve BFT consensus in parallel at relatively high throughputs
• To deal with high-latency inter-datacenter links, consensus cycles are pipelined, which allows multiple
consensus cycles to be executed in parallel, increasing throughput
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we outline the Canopus protocol,
deferring details to Reference [12]. Section 3 states our assumptions. We lay out some building blocks
for RCanopus in Section 4 and Section 7 discusses how we categorize different types of faults. Subsequent
sections address each category of fault and Section 13 summarizes the mitigation mechanisms.
∗W. Golab is with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering at the University of Waterloo
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2 Background
Canopus is a distributed coordination protocol implemented using a globally distributed set of servers called
nodes, each of which periodically collects a set of transactions, called a transaction block from its clients.
The nodes execute a consensus protocol to decide a global order on their transaction blocks.
Canopus does not rely on a single leader. Instead, it uses a virtual tree overlay for message dissemination
to limit network traffic across oversubscribed links. It leverages hardware redundancies, both within a rack
and inside the network fabric, to reduce both protocol complexity and communication overhead. These
design decisions enable Canopus to support large deployments without significant performance degradation.
The Canopus protocol divides execution into a sequence of consensus cycles. At the end of every consensus
cycle, all nodes achieve agreement or finality, that is, a total order on their inputs.1 Each cycle is labeled
with a monotonically increasing cycle ID. During a consensus cycle, the protocol determines the order of
pending write requests within transaction blocks received by nodes from clients before the start of the cycle
and performs the write requests in the same order at every node in the group. Read requests are responded
to by the node receiving it. Canopus provides linearizable consistency while allowing any node to service
read requests and without needing to disseminate read requests.
Canopus determines the ordering of the write requests by having each node, for each cycle, independently
choose a large random number, then ordering transaction blocks based on these random numbers. Ties are
expected to be rare and are broken deterministically using the unique IDs of the nodes. Requests received
by the same node are ordered by their order of arrival, which maintains request order for a client that sends
multiple outstanding requests in one session with a server during the same consensus cycle.
During each consensus cycle, each Canopus node disseminates the write requests it receives during the
previous cycle to every other node in a series of rounds. Instead of directly broadcasting requests to every
node in the group, which can create significant strain on oversubscribed links in a datacenter network or
wide-area links in a multi-datacenter deployment, message dissemination follows paths on a topology-aware
virtual tree overlay. Specifically, Canopus uses a Leaf-Only Tree overlay [2], that allows nodes arranged in
a logical tree to compute an arbitrary global aggregation function. Each round computes the state (ordered
set of transactions) at subsequently higher tiers of the overlay tree.
3 Assumptions
We now state the assumptions made in the design of RCanopus.
• A1. Crash-stop failures: Other than Byzantine failures (discussed as assumption A6), nodes fail
by crashing: there are no transient failures. A failed node rejoins the system only through a node-join
protocol (see Section 5.6). In contrast, network failures can be transient, so that a network partition
may recover due to extraneous recovery actions.
• A2: Reliable communication channel: We assume the existence of non-Byzantine communication
channels between all pairs of nodes, and between clients and nodes, that are not intermediated by
other nodes, but only by tamper-proof routers and links. Hence, we assume that there are no message
failures, such as losses, corruption, duplication, or reordering. In practice, this is easily achieved using
a combination of TCP and dynamic network routing.
• A3. Synchrony within an SL: We assume that nodes within a SL, which, by definition, are
connected by the same switch and in the same rack, run in a synchronous environment in which the
communication and processing delays are bounded by a known value δ. Formally,
1. in the absence of failure, the maximum communication delays between the nodes are known and
bounded
2. the maximum processing time required to execute each step of a deterministic algorithm is known
and bounded
1Some optimizations discussed later in this document postpone the commitment of transactions until a later cycle.
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and these bounds hold despite message, node, and link failures. Thus, we assume the existence of an
atomic broadcast primitive SLBroadcast(value) that satisfies the following properties [7]:
1. Validity: If a correct process broadcasts a message m, then it eventually delivers m.
2. Agreement: If a correct process delivers a message m, then all correct processes eventually
deliver m.
3. Integrity: For any message m, every correct process delivers m at most once, and only if m was
previously broadcast by its sender.
4. Total order: If correct processes p and q both deliver messages m and m′, then p delivers m
before m′ if and only if q delivers m before m′.
Such a primitive can be built using an approach such as AllConcur [11]. Moreover, using an approach
such as Zoolander [13], we assume if a call is made by a node in some SL to SLBroadcast(value) at
time t then it is received by all other live nodes in the same SL by time t+ δ.
• A4. Asynchronous inter-SL communication: To make progress despite the FLP impossibility
result[6], which states that safety and liveness cannot be simultaneously guaranteed in asynchronous
environments, our design gives up liveness in executions where the environment is unstable (e.g.,
messages are not delivered in a timely manner or processing of requests at servers is unusually slow).
A system that does not guarantee liveness in all executions is exempt from the FLP result, and is able
to maintain consistency despite (and during) network partitions.
Some parts of RCanopus, such as the global membership service, do require weak synchrony assump-
tions. However, these components operate on long time scales and can therefore be configured with
conservatively long timeouts for failure detection without compromising performance.
Practically speaking, this means that in the absence of a network partition, we assume that there is
an upper bound ∆ on the sum of inter-SL message delivery and server response times such that it is
possible for a node n to send a message to another node m and set a timeout such that, if the timeout
expires, then n can assume with high confidence that m is dead. Though there is some possibility that
m is actually only slow, not dead, or alive, but on the other side of a network partition; in this case,
the node coordinates with other nodes to establish consensus on m’s status. The timeout value should
be chosen long enough to allow for transient network partitions to recover; a partition lasting longer
than ∆ is equivalent to a permanent partition2. Moreover, we do not require clocks at different nodes
to be synchronized or run at the same rate, since the protocols are self-synchronizing.
• A5: PKI: We assume that every client and every Canopus node has its own ID and own private/public
key pair, so that every signed communication is non-repudiable and non-falsifiable. The public key of
a node can be viewed as its unique node identifier.
• A6: Byzantine failure of a super-leaf: We conservatively assume that if even one node in an SL
suffers from a Byzantine failure, the entire SL is Byzantine. This is based on the pragmatic observation
that all the nodes in an SL are likely to be homogeneous and in the same rack. Hence, if one of them
has been maliciously taken over, it is very likely the rest of the nodes on the rack have also been
similarly compromised.
• A7: Byzantine groups: We assume that we can partition S, the set of SLs, into a number of
mutually non-overlapping Byzantine groups (BGs) Bi where
⋃
iBi = S such that (a) sibling SLs in
each Byzantine group Bi are geographically ‘close’ and (b) if there can be fi Byzantine failures in BG
i, then |Bi| > 3fi ∀i. In other words, each BG is resilient to Byzantine node failures. Thus, the only
failure mode for a BG is a network partition that prevents it from achieving quorum. From outside
the BG, this appears as an atomic failure of the entire BG.
2During a network partition, nodes on one side of the partition are unable to communicate with nodes on the other side.
This does not make the network asynchronous: in an asynchronous network, any network communication may be subject to
failure.
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Note that to prevent Byzantine faults, all communications that are sent on behalf of the BG Bi must
be signed with a quorum certificate which proves that 2fi + 1 members of the BG (including at least
fi + 1 correct nodes) agree on the communication.
In practice, we expect each member of a Byzantine group to be hosted by a different cloud service
provider. Thus, a Byzantine failure models a security breach in a cloud service provider. We expect
that in most practical cases there will be only one such breach ongoing, so that, ∀i, fi = 1.
RCanopus does not provide safety if there are more than f malicious nodes in a single BG.
• A8: BG leaders form a Byzantine fault-tolerant group: Each BG elects a BG leader that
participates in a BFT consensus protocol. We assume that if the number of BG leaders who are
subject to Byzantine failure is at most fg then the number of BGs exceeds 3fg.
4 Building blocks
This section describes the major building blocks in our design.
4.1 Intra-SuperLeaf algorithms
Based on the assumption of a synchronous environment within a SL, we use standard approaches for crash-
fault tolerant (CFT) group membership, leader election, and atomic broadcast protocols.
• A group membership algorithm allows a set of nodes participating in a distributed protocol to learn of
each other. When a node leaves, the remaining nodes agree that the node has left, and when a node
joins, all other nodes agree that the new node is a member.
• Leader election involves agreeing on the identity of a distinguished node from a set of eligible nodes.
In practice, multiple rounds of leader election may need to executed before a leader is chosen because
a tentatively-chosen leader may fail during the election process and may need to be replaced.
• With atomic broadcast, meaning that all nodes can broadcast messages to each other and receive
messages in the same (arbitrarily decided) order.
All three algorithms can be implemented using well-known systems such as ZooKeeper [8], Raft [10] or
AllConcur [11]. Hence, we do not discuss these further.
4.2 Byzantine groups
By Assumption A7, geographically-close SLs are grouped together to form a Byzantine Group (BG). We
expect these SLs to be hosted at a variety of hosting providers, so that compromise of a single SL in a BG
would not result in the compromise of its peer SLs in the same BG.
We make each BGi resilient to Byzantine faults in its member SLs by relying on existing Byzantine
consensus protocols such as PBFT [5], BFT-SMART [4], or SBFT [?]. Such a scheme is immune to up to fi
simultaneous node failures as long as the number of nodes in the BG is at least 3i+ 1. Importantly, each of
these schemes delivers a quorum certificate that guarantees that the consensus value is valid. The certificate
contains signatures from a (2fi+1) quorum of nodes that can be verified by the recipient and guarantees that
the information contained in any message is valid. Also, to prevent replay attacks, the certificate contains
the current cycle number.
BFT consensus is also used to maintain SL membership status in the BG: it is the set of SLs reporting
transactions in the latest completed BG consensus. If there is a network partition, SLs in the minority
partition cannot submit their transactions, so are automatically excluded from membership.
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4.3 Global coordination
In addition to consensus on membership within an SL and in a BG, we also need to achieve BFT consensus
on a system-wide (‘global’) scale for:
• obtaining of the set of emulators of a vnode at the BG level or higher
• dealing with apparent failures of BGs/vnodes arising from a network partition
• learning the quorum size in each BG (the number of signatures in each Byzantine Group’s quorum
certificate that is necessary to validate it) during each consensus cycle
• creating and storing global quorum certificates to certify the set of BGs participating in each cycle
(these are discussed in more detail in Section 5.5.3)
To do so, we deploy a global BFT membership service provided by a set of BG leaders, each elected from
among the monitors of every live BG. Note that this distributed service itself needs to be BFT since BG
leaders may suffer from Byzantine failures. Thus, this service is likely to have high latency in performing
updates. Nevertheless, it can serve read requests relatively quickly since each BG leader participating in this
service can cache membership state along with its quorum certificate.
4.3.1 Convergence Module-based global coordination
An alternative approach is for global coordination to be done “in-band” with respect to the consensus
protocol using a specialized transaction type that must be endorsed by an authorized system administrator.
This approach associates group membership data with each cycle in a precise way: a group membership
change proposed in cycle C becomes effective in cycle C + k where k is the pre-defined and constant depth
of the processing pipeline.
Convergence of each consensus cycle despite network partitions and BG failures is achieved using a
service called the Convergence Module (CM) (details can be found in Appendix A. The CM internally keeps
track of BGs that are suspected of being faulty, but operates orthogonally to the mechanism responsible
for recording group membership. In particular, a BG can participate in the consensus protocol and yet its
input may be excluded from a particular consensus cycle by the CM because the BG was deemed faulty.
Repeated exclusions of a BG from consecutive consensus cycles may nevertheless prompt administrators to
apply manual group membership changes.
Roughly speaking, the protocol functions as follows: a BG that stalls during a particular consensus cycle
because it is unable to retrieve the inputs of one or more other BGs reports the situation to the CM, who then
determines the output of the cycle under consideration as the union of the inputs of a carefully selected subset
of BGs. For example, the subset can be determined in a manner that ensures sufficient replication, meaning
that a BG’s input is included in the output of a given cycle only if it has been replicated at R or more BGs
for some administrator-defined threshold R. To reduce overhead, optimizations are defined to bypass the CM
entirely in absence of failures, and also to minimize interaction with the CM during network partitions that
last many consensus cycles. These optimizations deal with complex scenarios involving Byzantine failures
and concurrency.
5 Design
We now describe the design of the RCanopus system. We begin with actions taken by a client, which sends
transactions to RCanopus nodes. We then discuss operation of a node during each RCanopus cycle. Some
nodes play the role of a representative or monitor, and some monitors are also BG leaders. We discuss
the actions taken by each such role. Note that although we discuss actions in each cycle independently,
RCanopus is pipelined, that is, multiple cycles are in progress simultaneously, as shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: RCanopus pipeline. b is chosen to be longer than the intra-SL consensus time. The long latency
for inter-BG exchanges results in multiple simultaneous incomplete cycles outstanding at any point in time.
5.1 Client actions
Clients3 send their transactions, each accompanied by a client-generated transaction id and a client-generated
nonce, both signed by the the client’s private key, to RCanopus nodes. As in PBFT [5], clients first send
transactions to a node in the closest SL. To prevent Byzantine nodes from simply ignoring their transactions,
if the client’s transaction does not appear in the ordering service’s output within a configurable timeout
period, the request is sent to nodes in fi additional, different SLs in BGi. Note that this requires clients to
know the identities of the BG leaders and their public keys so that the quorum size of BGi is known and
verifiable.
A Byzantine client could try to confuse the system by sending inconsistent transactions to nodes in
different SLs. This is, however, easy to detect because a valid client must send the same transaction to all
nodes with the same client-generated nonce. Any deviation from this immediately identifies the client as
being malicious.
When they are ready to commit results from a cycle, nodes respond to clients with proof that their
transactions were incorporated into the global transaction order. The proof consists of two items4:
3In the context of Hyperledger Fabric, the client is the orderer’s front end, that accesses the RCanopus ordering service
through the chain interface.
4The proof does not need to include a global quorum certificate (discussed later) showing the certifying BGi was a member
of the system during cycle c. This is because BGi can only generate and return a valid quorum certificate if it is live (see
Section 5.5.2) and has fi or fewer malicious nodes.
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1. A Merkle tree branch connecting the client’s transaction to the root for a transaction block (TB).
2. A quorum certificate from BGi certifying that TB was committed at cycle c. Specifically, the certificate
should include TB ’s Merkle tree root.
5.2 Node actions
We now discuss the actions taken by all RCanopus nodes, independent of their role.
5.2.1 Collecting client transactions
In the first round of each consensus cycle, all nodes within an SL share their state (i.e., set of client trans-
actions) with each other. Let batch time, b be a constant chosen such that all BGs can come to consensus
withing time b, and such that b >> δ, where δ is the maximum round-trip communication delay in the
synchronous SL environment. Then, the first round lasts 2b seconds (see Figure 1).
During the first b seconds of the round, a node collects transactions from its clients. It atomically
broadcasts these transactions to its peers at the end of this time. By Assumption A3, this state stabilizes
within b more seconds. Hence, when the round ends, all live nodes agree on the ordered list of transactions
received by nodes in the SL during the first half of the round5. Because of pipelining, consensus cycles start
every b seconds as shown in Figure 1.
5.2.2 Transaction numbering
A node assigns a transaction number to each transaction block (TB) of client transactions that it receives.
This is used to identify the position of the block in the global order. It is possible for a Byzantine node to
deliberately choose this number in a way that increases the chance for the TB ending up near the top or the
bottom of the global order. To prevent this attack, the transaction number of a TB chosen as a Merkle hash
of the transactions. Moreover, when TBs are further aggregated, the newly-created parent node orders its
child subtrees by their Merkle roots, forming a unique and non-manipulable total order.
5.2.3 Delayed commit
Nodes commit the state6 computed at the end of cycle c at the end of cycle c+ 1, i.e, delayed by b seconds.
This is because at this time it can be sure that every other node in the system also will either commit or
not commit a given other BG’s state, guaranteeing safety. This is discussed in more detail in Section 12
5.3 Representative and emulator actions
5.3.1 Representative election
A certain number of nodes in an SL are elected as SL representatives to fetch remote state. For example,
these could be the monitor node and any other node designated to act as a representative by the monitor.
In the third and subsequent RCanopus rounds of each cycle, representatives from each SL fetch vnode state
from the vnode’s emulators (i.e. any subtended pnode).
5.3.2 State request and response
At the start of each cycle, monitors learn of the list of vnodes (at the BG level and higher), the IP addresses
of their emulators, and BG quorum sizes from the global membership service, specifically, from the local
BG leader, which is the closest service representative7. These are then disseminated to the representatives.
Subsequently, representatives send state requests to these emulators to learn about the state of one of their
ancestor vnodes.
5Note that some of these transactions may originate from servers that failed after communicating their state to peers in the
SL using atomic broadcast. This is silently ignored since it does not affect safety.
6In the context of Fabric, this corresponds to sending a list of transactions to the orderer through the chain interface.
7If this BG leader is Byzantine, it may deny service, in which case the request can be sent to any other BG leader. This
requires the list of BG leaders and their public keys to be globally known and periodically refreshed.
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As with clients, to improve performance despite Byzantine emulator faults, a representative first contacts
a single emulator for each BG, starting a retry timer (on the order of ∆) before sending the state request
message8. On a timeout, it contacts fi additional emulators from fi distinct additional SLs in BGi.
On receiving a request, the emulator sends either a state response with the requested state, along with
a quorum certificate, or a null response, indicating that it does not yet have the desired state; subsequently
sending the full response when it does become available. On receiving a non-null response if the quorum
certificate has more signatures than the underlying BG’s quorum size, the representative broadcasts this
response to all SL nodes. On receiving such a broadcast, other representatives trying to obtain a response
from that BG abort.
There are two possible failure cases:
• The emulator may send a null response. If so, the emulator will send the response later, when it become
available (transforming a pull to a push).
• The emulator may fail or be inordinately delayed, causing expiry of the retry timer at the representative.
If so, the representative tries to contact each of the vnode’s other emulators in turn. If all emulators
for the vnode are inaccessible, the representative indicates, using an atomic broacast, that it is stalled.
In both cases, it is possible that while waiting for a response, some other representative may have already
obtained the vnode’s state. If so, the representative aborts it own request and takes no further action.
5.3.3 Recovery from representative failure
The monitor keeps track of the status of representatives (i.e, whether they are live, stalled, or failed). On
the failure of a representative, the monitor chooses a new representative, which takes on the responsibilities
of the failed representative. If all representatives are stalled in trying to obtain a response from a BG,
indicating either a BG failure or a system partition, the monitor initiates recovery, as discussed in Section
5.4.3.
5.3.4 Emulator behaviour on loss of consensus within the SL
The intra-SL consensus service becomes unavailable when it loses quorum. If a node acting as an emulator
detects that the service has lost quorum, it stalls, that is, stops responding to state requests. This is to
prevent a ‘split brain’ in case of an SL partition (see Section 9.2). When service is restored, the nodes need
to rejoin using a rejoin process, discussed in Section 5.6.
5.4 Monitor actions
The monitor is responsible for several distinct sets of actions, as discussed in this section.
5.4.1 Byzantine consensus on transaction order
In the second round of each cycle, monitors in the SLs of each BGi come to a consensus about transaction
order. Since entire SLs can be Byzantine, it is necessary to use a BFT consensus protocol to achieve
consensus. At the end of this consensus, each monitor obtains a total ordering of client transactions and a
quorum certificate that certifies this ordering with 2fi + 1 signatures. Monitors also learn about which other
monitors have failed, either due to crash failure of their SL, Byzantine failure of their SL, or BG partition.
Recall that clients may send their transactions to multiple nodes in multiple SLs, which causes duplicate
transactions to enter the system. Duplicate transactions are detected using the per-transaction client-
generated nonce, and must be removed during the computation of the BG quorum certificate. It is possible
for client-initiated transactions to be received by different nodes at different times, and may hence be part
of different RCanopus cycles. To deal with this situation, during the BG consensus protocol, monitors buffer
a hash of recently-submitted transactions, removing duplicate transactions as necessary.
8This timer value can be estimated by measuring response times, using the same approach as that used for TCP retrans-
mission timers.
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5.4.2 Identifying and removing failed nodes from the list of BG emulators
Monitors are responsible for updating the global consensus service to remove failed nodes from their SL
(detected using the intra-SL consensus protocol) from the list of emulators for the enclosing BG. This
requires a quorum certificate from the BG to prevent Byzantine monitors from causing trouble. Hence, the
monitor first contacts its peer monitors in its BG and proposes to them that a specific node in its SL has
failed. Each monitor sets a timer and independently tries to contact the potentially failed node. If a quorum
of monitors agrees that the node has indeed failed, then they generate a quorum certificate, which is then
submitted to the BG leader to update the global consensus service, removing this node from the list of the
BG’s emulators.
5.4.3 Initiating a response to system partition
Monitors are responsible for initiating the response to a network partition. Recall that at the start of each
consensus cycle, the monitor from each SL obtains a list of emulators for each vnode at the BG level and
above from its BG leader, who is the local representative for the global consensus service. If there is a system
partition, BG leaders in the minority partition(s) will (eventually) fail to achieve quorum and the monitor
will receive a ‘loss of quorum’ message9. This results in the stalling of all nodes in all BGs in the minority
partition, as desired. Correct nodes will rejoin the system only by using the node re-join process, when they
are asked to rejoin by their BG leader (accompanied by a global quorum certificate).
We now consider the situation, when, during a network partition, representatives potentially obtain
a stale list of emulators corresponding to inaccessible BGs, stalling representatives who are waiting for a
response from them. These stalled representatives indicate their status to their monitor. When the monitor
detects that all the representatives in the SL have stalled waiting for state from a remote BG I, it initiates
a Byzantine consensus on the status of this BG with peer monitors. On invocation, monitors in the BG
try to achieve consensus on the state of the stalled BG. Specifically, each monitor checks whether or not its
representatives think that the BG has become uncontactable. If so (because all of its representatives were
unable to contact the SL), then it agrees to the proposal that the BG be marked as failed.
The outcome of the consensus is either agreement that the BG has failed, or a quorum of nodes respond
with the state of the BG thought to have failed, which is then shared with the monitors in the BG. If all the
monitors in the BG agree that BG I is indeed inaccessible, then the BG leader initiates consensus on this at
the global level, as discussed in Section 5.5.
5.4.4 Recovery from monitor failure
Nodes in each SL keep track of the status of the monitor. On monitor failure, leader election is used to
choose a new monitor, which takes on the responsibilities of the failed monitor. In particular, the new
monitor replaces the old monitor as a member of the BG. It also chooses new representatives, if necessary.
5.5 BG leader actions
In each BG, a leader election amongst the monitors is used to elect a BG leader. The set of BG leaders is
collectively responsible for providing the global consensus service discussed in Section 4.3. The alternative
CM service is discussed in Appendix B.
5.5.1 Responding to membership requests
BG leaders respond to BG membership requests from representatives with a list of vnodes at the BG level
and higher in the system and the IP addresses of their emulators. To prevent attacks, this list is released
only after validation that access is permitted to the requestor. For each BG, the BG leader also responds
with the size of its quorum, so that it is possible to verify that a response from an emulator has the requisite
number of signatures. The response itself is signed by a quorum of BG leaders.
9Even if they do obtain a stale list of emulators, the SL’s representatives will stall when trying to contact these emulators,
preserving safety.
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5.5.2 Dealing with and recovering from a system partition
When a BG comes to BFT consensus that some set of other BGs are unreachable, its BG leader contacts its
BG leader peers to initiate a BFT consensus on membership. At the end of this consensus, BG leaders in
the super-majority know of the set of BGs unreachable from their partition, and they inform the monitors in
their own BGs (along with a quorum certificate) to not stall waiting for inputs from these inaccessible BGs.
This allows recovery of liveness. BG leaders in the minority partition(s), however, stall, and this causes their
BGs to stall, as desired.
This process is expensive, but is only resorted to rarely: only in case of a BG failure or system partition.
Moreover, it works correctly even if a BG’s failure detectors are unreliable: what is important is not that a
BG’s failure be perfectly known, but that the rest of the BGs agree to ignore it.
To preserve safety, once emulators in some BG have been informed by their BG leader that some other
BG has failed, they should not respond to requests from representatives in the failed BG until either their
BG leader informs them that the formerly failed BG has re-joined using the periodic global BFT consensus,
described next. Moreover, nodes in the BG do not respond to clients, also to preserve safety.
5.5.3 Periodic resynchronization
BG leaders periodically establish consensus on the global set of BGs and their emulators using a BFT
consensus protocol. Specifically, during each such global consensus, the BG leaders use a BFT consensus
protocol to agree on (a) the list of BGs in the system (b) the set of emulators for each BG, and (c) the
quorum size for each BG. Any updates to the list of BGs be signed by at least 2fg + 1 BG leaders; updates
to the set of emulators and the quorum size of BGi must be signed by at least 2fi + 1 monitors in that BG.
BGs and SLs are only allowed to become part of the system during this synchronization point. Thus, in
the period between synchronizations, which we call an epoch, BG membership is static, other than removal
of BGs, subsequent to the detection and consensus on a BG failure or system partition event. Moreover, the
list of emulators for each BG is also not allowed to change.
One outcome of the synchronization is a global quorum certificate per epoch that certifies the set of
participating BGs for that epoch as well as the cycles that have been committed during that epoch. This
must be signed by at least 2fg + 1 BG leaders. The global quorum certificate, along with a corresponding
set of BG-specific quorum certificates, fully describes the set of transactions in a cycle and the BGs who
participated in the cycle, and this description is both non-manipulable and immutable. Hence, this certificate
can be replayed to newly joined BGs to resynchronize them.
While synchronization process is expensive, doing it once every, say, 100,000 cycles, amortizes the cost10
Note that because the set of emulators for each BG is only updated during the periodic global consensus,
the list of emulators could be stale, missing a newly live potential emulator or leading to the global service
responding with an emulator that is actually not live. These errors are benign, due to the use of multiple
emulators for each vnode. If a live node is missed, other live nodes are available to respond to queries from
representatives. Symmetrically, if a node thought to be live is actually dead, or behind a partition, this is
identical to the case when the node dies after the membership response. So, this level of staleness does not
pose a problem.
5.6 Node/SL/BG Join/Re-join Protocol
A new or a newly-live node must first make its presence known to the intra-SL membership service. If the
node is elected as a leader, it becomes both a monitor and a representative, and chooses some other nodes
in the SL to serve as representatives.
Special care must be taken when a node joins an SL that is thought by its BG peer SLs to be dead due to
either a crash failure or a network partition. If a newly-joined node discovers that it has restored quorum to
the SL’s consensus service, then it knows that the SL is recovering from a crash failure. Thus, its (perhaps
newly-elected) monitor sends announcements to monitors in peer SLs proposing that it now be considered
alive. If a quorum of monitors, using a BFT consensus algorithm, agree to this, then the SL’s status is
10In practice, it is likely that BG additions will be rare. It may hence be sufficient to require BG additions to be done out-
of-band, and manually, with periodic consensus only used for refreshing the list of BG emulators or dealing with system-wide
network partitions.
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updated by other monitors in the BG. Since every RCanopus cycle requires one round of BFT consensus
within each BG, this is synchronized with BFT consensus on transaction order. The new SL is given all the
state that it missed by one of its peers, which is the set of its missed transactions along with their quorum
certificates.
Similarly, if a BG wishes to rejoins the system after a system-wide network partition, it must wait for the
next periodic global consensus. At this time, newly-live BGs recover their state from peer BGs by obtaining
missing transactions (with corresponding BG quorum certificates), that they can verify using global quorum
certificates for missed epochs.
6 Safety and liveness
In this section, we prove that RCanopus is always safe and live when the situation permits. Specifically, we
prove the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (Safety and liveness). RCanopus provides the following guarantees:
1. Safety: At the end of every consensus cycle, all live nodes agree on the same order of write transactions
from all clients.
2. Liveness: In a system where
• up to f crash failures can occur in each SL
• up to fi SL Byzantine failures can occur in BGi
• up to fg BG leaders can have Byzantine failures
if
• the number of nodes in each SL exceeds 2f
• the number of SLs in BGi exceeds 3fi
• the number of BGs exceeds 3fg
• there is no system-wide network partition
then every live node completes every consensus cycle, despite up to f crash failures in every SL,
Byzantine failures in up to fi SLs in BGi; up to fg Byzantine-failed BG leaders; and up to fg BG
crash failures.
If there is a partition, SLs/BGs in the super-majority partition, if such a super-majority partition
exists, will be live and other SLs/BGs stall.
Proof. (sketch) The proof is in two parts. First, in Section 7, we enumerate all possible faults in the system.
Then, in Sections 8-12 we consider the impact of each fault on safety and liveness. We show that despite
faults, safety and liveness are lost only under the conditions enumerated in the statement of the theorem.
7 Fault categories
This section enumerates the potential faults that may occur in the RCanopus system and their potential
impacts. Over and above standard message failures, such as losses, duplication, and corruption, faults arise
from three causes: crashes, Byzantine failure, and network partition and they can affect either a node, an
SL, a Byzantine group, or the entire system11. Hence, we can enumerate all fault categories as follows:
Nodes can fail by crashing. If nodes fail during the first round of a cycle before they share their state
with at least one peer, their state will not be accessible by other nodes and these transactions are lost to
the system. However, if they are able to communicate their transactions to at least one other node before
11We ignore message failures based on our assumption of reliable communication channels.
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Entity Crash possible? Partition Byzantine failure?
possible?
Node Yes N/A Yes
SL Yes Yes Yes
BGi with > 3fiSLs If < fi failures then no Yes If < fi failures then no
else yes else yes
Global membership svc. If < fg BG leader failures Yes If < fg BG leader failures then no
with > 3fg BG leaders then no else yes else yes
System N/A Yes N/A
Table 1: A broad categorization of all possible faults in the system. “N/A” indicates the fault is either not
possible or ignored.
failing, these transactions may become available to the rest of the system. Node failures are masked by their
SL peers, unless there are too many node failures within an SL, in which case the SL itself fails. Nodes
can also launch several types of Byzantine attacks. The failure of a node that acts as a representative or a
monitor has other consequences, depending on the nature of the role, as discussed in more detail below.
If too many nodes in an SL fail, then the SL loses quorum, and the entire SL is stalled. This manifests
itself as a SL crash failure. It is unlikely, but possible, that an SL partitions. This may also result in loss of
quorum in the minority partition or both partitions. If so, the net result is either a set of node failures (similar
to the node case above) or an SL crash failure. In case of partition, to prevent loss of safety due to a split
brain, the minority partition must stall. Moreover, to preserve liveness with safety, the majority partition
needs to achieve consensus on the set of failed/unreachable nodes. Finally, SLs can manifest Byzantine
failures, and these are masked by their Byzantine group.
By definition, a Byzantine group BGiwith more than 3fi + 1 SL members is resilient to Byzantine
failures of up to fi SLs. If there are more than fi failures, to preserve safety, the entire BG should stall,
causing a BG crash failure. As with an SL, in case of partition, to prevent loss of safety due to a split brain,
the minority partition must stall. Moreover, to preserve liveness with safety, the majority partition needs to
achieve consensus on the set of failed/unreachable SLs. We use the same BFT consensus protocol both for
consensus on transaction order and on membership.
The global membership service is provided by the BG leaders. It also runs a BFT consensus protocol,
hence has the same failure conditions as individual BGs, except that the number of failed BGs must be no
more than fg.
The entire system is susceptible to partition failure. These are due to crashes of multiple BGs or a
network partition. These failures need to be handled by the surviving BGs, if possible. As with SLs and
BGs, in case of partition, to prevent loss of safety due to a split brain, the minority partition must stall.
Moreover, to preserve liveness with safety, the majority partition needs to achieve consensus on the set of
failed/unreachable BGs/SLs.
Finally, we need to deal with a special case, where a subtree of the system subtended by the root completes
a cycle, then fails, before communicating with the rest of the system. This can cause a violation of safety.
Given this discussion, we enumerate the potential set of faults in the system in Table 2. In the next
several sections, we discuss the impact of each class of failure on system safety and liveness.
8 Impact of node failures on safety and liveness
Note that, independent of its type, one outcome of a node failure is to cause the eventual removal of its
corresponding ephemeral znode in its local ZooKeeper. The node’s peers, who have access to this ZooKeeper
service, can thus achieve consensus on its state.
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Failure class Fault Potential impact
F1: Node crash Node failure in first round Safety: inconsistent views on failed node’s state
F2: Node crash Emulator failure Liveness: no response to representative
F3: Node crash Representative failure Liveness: SL missing state updates
F4: Node crash Monitor failure SL may lose liveness
F5: Node Byzantine Attack on transaction numbering Safety: Transactions from this node
likely to be first or last in global order
F6: Node Byzantine Emulators non-responsive Liveness: Same as SL crash failure
F7: Node Byzantine Node ignores client Safety: Client DoS
F8: Node Byzantine Emulator lying Safety: Any message from emulator may be a lie
F9: SL crash SL failure Safety: Unable to learn SL’s state
Liveness: Peer SLs may stall
F10: SL partition SL splits into partitions Safety: Possibility of split brain;
Liveness: No SL partition may have quorum,
leading to nodes stalling
F11: SL Byzantine Messages from SL not trustworthy Safety: Cannot rely on any message
from the failed SL
F12: BG crash BG fails or is attacked Safety: Unable to learn BG’s state
Liveness: peer BGs may stall
F13: BG partition SLs on different sides cannot Safety: Inconsistent views of SL’s state
communicate
F14: BG leader failure BG leader fails Liveness: monitors and representatives stall
F15: System partition BGs on opposite sides cannot Safety: Inconsistent views of BG’s state
communicate
F16: Early exit A subtree of BGs subtended by the Loss of safety
root completes a cycle and fails
Table 2: Potential faults.
8.1 F1: Node failures during the first round
In the first round of each consensus cycle, nodes share their state (i.e., list of client transactions) with each
other using atomic broadcast. For safety, all nodes in the SL need to agree on the same set of transactions.
By using an intra-SL consensus protocol, agreement on this set can be reached in an SL with more than 2f
nodes despite up to f failures.
It is important to ensure that all nodes in the SL agree on the set of transactions before these are shared
with other SLs in the BG. Recall that transactions within an SL are shared only b seconds after the start of
the round, and that the duration of a round is much larger than the time taken to establish consensus within
an SL (see Figure 1). This procedure results in safety despite node failures. Liveness of the SL is achieved as
long as there are a sufficient number of live nodes within an SL to achieve quorum for the intra-SL consensus
protocol.
8.2 Node failures during the second round
In the second round of each cycle, monitors use a BFT consensus protocol to achieve consensus as discussed
in Section 9.3. Such a protocol is tolerant of node failures, treating them similar to Byzantine failures.
Specifically, as long as there are enough live nodes and SLs to obtain a quorum certificate, the BG maintains
both safety and liveness despite multiple node and SL faults12, else there is no liveness.
12Of course, network partitions can cause the BG to lose liveness. This is discussed later.
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8.3 Node failures during subsequent rounds
We need to deal with the possibility of a node failure causing either an emulator or a representative to fail.
We deal with each case in turn.
8.3.1 F2: Emulator crash failure
A representative that relies on an emulator that has crashed is able to make progress by attempting to obtain
state from one of the crashes emulator’s peers, maintaining liveness. An SL only stalls if all emulators of a
vnode fail, which corresponds to the failure of one or more BGs. The impact of such a failure on liveness is
discussed in Section 10.1.
8.3.2 F3: Representative crash failure
If one of the representatives in an SL fails, this failure is known the the SL’s monitor, which asks another
node in the SL to become a representative, and takes over the responsibility of fetching remote state from
the failed representative, maintaining liveness. Note that if the number of live nodes in the SL is ≤ k the
SL may have fewer than k representatives. If all the representatives in an SL fail, this indicates that the SL
itself has failed, similar to an SL crash failure. The impact of this failure on liveness is discussed in Section
9.1.
8.4 F4: Monitor failure
If the SL’s monitor fails, this is detected during the next intra-SL atomic broadcast by the other nodes in the
SL. On detecting this, a new leader is elected and asked to become the monitor. A newly-elected monitor
also joins the appropriate BG.
8.5 F5: Byzantine attack on transaction numbering
With the Merkle-root based computation, neither Byzantine nodes nor clients can game the system. Trans-
action ordering is completely dependent on other transactions in the current cycle. Furthermore, the infor-
mation is hidden until the time of aggregation, which happens in parallel with batch sorting. Lastly, there
is no overhead involved in this procedure, because the Merkle root is needed for the blockchain verification
anyway.
8.6 F6: Byzantine attack: emulators non-responsive
A Byzantine node serving as an emulator may not respond to representatives. If this happens, then, from
the representative’s perspective, the situation is identical to node failure, and the mitigation approach is also
the same.
8.7 F7: Byzantine node ignores client
A failed node can only ignore messages from its clients; it cannot create fraudulent transactions on behalf
of its clients because it does not have the client’s private key. To prevent transaction loss, recall that a
timed-out client sends its transactions to fi additional nodes in distinct SLs in the same BG.
8.8 F8: Byzantine emulator lies
Due to the potential for Byzantine failures, any message coming from an emulator is inherently unreliable.
To mitigate this problem, every message from every emulator is accompanied by a quorum certificate and is
checked by the receiving representative.
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9 Impact of SL failures on safety and liveness
9.1 F9: SL crash failures
It is possible that enough nodes in the SL fail that there is a loss of quorum in its ZooKeeper service. In
this case, the SL will suffer from a crash failure, and, to preserve safety, all live nodes in the SL should stall.
This will appear to other SLs in the BG as a network partition. We discuss how this is handled in Section
10.3, which deals with BG partitions.
9.2 F10: SL partition
An SL typically is comprised of servers on the same rack and connected by a single switch. Hence, it is very
unlikely to partition. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, we consider the impact of the partitioning
of an SL on system safety and liveness. Two cases are possible: one of the SL partitions has a quorum of
servers (i.e., it is the majority partition), or no SL partition has a quorum of servers.
If there is no majority partition, all nodes in the SL stall, and the situation is identical to the SL crashing
(Section 9.1), since stalled emulators will not respond to state requests when quorum is lost (even with a
null response).
If there is a majority partition, then, by definition, the majority partition has a quorum of servers. These
servers establish consensus that all nodes in the minority partitions are unreachable. When a node is able to
re-establish connection with the consensus service, it should rejoin the SL using the join protocol in Section
5.6; other nodes in the SL should not respond to excluded nodes.
9.3 F11: SL Byzantine failure
It is possible for a Byzantine SL to attack the other SLs in its BG by:
1. giving inconsistent responses to other SLs when asked for transactions that it received from its clients,
which form its own state
2. lying about membership in its own SL
We consider each in turn.
9.3.1 Byzantine attacks on transactions
Recall that each client submits its transactions (eventually) to fi + 1 SLs. Moreover, these transactions are
signed with the client’s private key and the set of transactions are ordered by a hash on the transaction. In
the second round of each cycle, these fi + 1 SLs use a BFT consensus algorithm to compute a consistent
order of client transactions (Section 4.2). Thus, even with fi failures, a malicious SL cannot tamper with,
reorder, or create fraudulent client transactions. This implies that, at the end of round 2 in each cycle, it
is possible to obtain a Byzantine fault-tolerant ordering of the write transactions. along with the quorum
certificate, mitigating Byzantine attacks on transactions.
In subsequent rounds, state queries received by emulators for their ancestor vnodes are responded to with
the state computed using the BFT algorithm, along with a quorum certificate computed for each SL. Thus,
in subsequent rounds, the only possible attack by a malicious node would be to omit the transactions from
one or more Byzantine groups. However, there can be at most fi malicious SLs in Byzantine group i. Recall
that representatives from other BGs (eventually) contact at least fi + 1 emulators (from fi + 1 different SLs)
from each Byzantine group, so are guaranteed at least one valid response. This prevents the attack.
9.3.2 Byzantine attacks on membership
Within a BG, the only Byzantine attack on membership possible is for a malicious SL to lie about the nodes
in its SL when participating in the BG membership service (Section 4.2). It could pretend that it has some
nodes that it doesn’t actually have, or not list all of its members. However, there is no advantage to lying. If
the SL claims a node to be a member, but it is not one in reality, then requests to this node will not result in
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responses. On the other hand, if the SL does not reveal one of its nodes, then this node will not be available
to use as an emulator. In either case, the SL can, at worst, deny certain requests, but cannot cause harm.
10 Impact of BG failures on safety and liveness
In this section, we discuss how to deal with more than fi SL crash failures in BGi, stalling its BFT consensus
protocol, or when the BG partitions.
10.1 F12: BG crash failure
It is possible that enough SLs in the BG fail that there is a loss of quorum in the BG membership service.
In this case, the BG will fail. Live nodes in the BG detect this as a loss of the BG’s BFT consensus service.
In this case, to preserve safety, all live nodes should stall. This will appear to other BGs in the system as a
network partition, and handled accordingly, as discussed in Section 11.
10.2 F13: BG partition
RCanopus tolerates a BG partition (or, equivalently, SL crash failure) by design. Recall that the monitors of
SLs in a BG need to achieve BFT consensus in each cycle. During a network partition event, the SL monitors
in the super-majority partition (if one exists) will view inaccessible SLs as having failed, and will create a
quorum certificate that only includes transactions from nodes in the SLs in the super-majority partition.
Monitors, and hence nodes, in the minority partition(s) stall, lacking the quorum to achieve BFT consensus.
When the partition heals, all nodes in the minority partition(s) will need to explicitly rejoin the system,
and nodes in the super-majority partition should ignore messages received from these nodes until they have
explicitly rejoined the system.
Note that if the BG partitions such that all partitions have less than a super-majority of SLs, then the
BG loses liveness.
10.3 F14: BG leader failure
BG leaders can fail by crashing or with a Byzantine fault. However, if fewer than fg leaders fail, the use of
BFT consensus amongst BG leaders assures safety at all times, and liveness when situations permit.
11 F15: Impact of system partition on safety and liveness
We now discuss the case where a network partition event separates some set of BGs from others. Such a
partition is nearly identical to the crash failure of one or more BGs in that, from the perspective of the other
BGs, some BGs are (perhaps temporarily) unreachable and therefore potentially dead. What is important,
however, is that nodes in BG that are actually alive, but in a minority partition must stall to avoid having
a ‘split brain’ situation, compromising safety.
When using the CM to deal with partition tolerance, we show in the Appendix, that using the CM leads
to safety always, and liveness when possible.
The alternative is to use the global consensus service to deal with partitions. Recall that BG leaders use
a BFT consensus protocol to update their view of global BG membership when monitors in a BG come to
BFT consensus about the inaccessibility of a remote BG. This consensus is possible only in a super-majority
partition, thus stalled representatives and nodes can be unstalled only in such a partition. Thus, all nodes
in minority partitions will stall (guaranteeing safety) and nodes in the super-majority partition (should one
exist) will eventually achieve liveness. Note that if the system partitions such that all partitions have less
than a super-majority of BGs, then the system loses liveness.
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12 F16: Early exit
It is easiest to understand the problem of early exit from a concrete example. Consider the situation where
the RCanopus system consists of four BGs subtended by the root. Suppose that one of the BGs obtains
all the information it needs from the other BGs, sends information back to its clients, then fails, but before
communicating any data to the other BGs. In this case, the remaining BGs will exclude the failed BG’s
transactions, but clients can receive inconsistent results, compromising safety. This situation holds whenever
a subtree of BGs subtended by the root all fail (or are partitioned) before communicating with the remainder.
To prevent this, recall that nodes only commit state computed in cycle c at the end of their cycle c+ 1.
To see this this preserves safety, note that for a BG n to reach the end of its c + 1 cycle, it must receive
input from every other live BG m earlier in that cycle. But this is only possible if m was live at the end
of the cth cycle. Thus, if n has reached the end of the c + 1th cycle, it (and all other live BGs who have
reached the end of that cycle) can be sure that m was live at the end of the cth cycle, which means that m’s
contribution to global state in cycle c can be safely committed.
Note that if m did indeed fail then n will stall before it reaches the end of the c + 1th cycle, triggering
a BFT consensus on excluding m in the c + 1th cycle. In this case, all BGs need to achieve consensus on
removing m’s state from the system to achieve liveness with safety. However, we expect this to happen
rarely, so the recovery mechanisms can be somewhat complex. In contrast, in the common case, consensus
on safety is achieved with only a slight delay and no loss of throughput. In short, a one-cycle-delay allows
a node to establish consensus about safety without having to consult an additional out-of-band consensus
algorithm.
13 Summary of mitigation mechanisms
Table 3 summarizes the mitigation mechanisms presented in this document.
14 Conclusion
This document presents the design of the RCanopus system, which maintains several essential aspects of
the Canopus protocol, but adds several mechanisms to make it resilient to a variety of faults. A detailed
analysis of potential faults shows that RCanopus can tolerate Byzantine failure, network partitioning, node
crashes, and message loss. We how how this can be achieved without sacrificing pipelining and the Canopus
round-based massively-parallel communication pattern.
In future work, we plan to implement and test RCanopus. We also plan to integrate into well-known
permissioned blockchain systems such as HyperLedger Fabric and Parity’s Substrate.
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A The Convergence Module (CM)
The Convergence Module (CM) is a mechanism for ensuring convergence in all-to-all communication despite
network partitions and failures of components. It offers the following advantages:
1. It maintains safety in an asynchronous environment.
2. An administrator-defined policy can be defined to determine how to deal with transactions proposed
by unavailable BGs.
The high-level approach is applicable to all three layers of RCanopus (intra-SL, inter-SL/intra-BG, and inter-
BG) but for concreteness this section describes specifically the variation applicable to the inter-BG layer,
where it is implemented using a Byzantine fault-tolerant replicated state machine (RSM) deployed on the
same physical infrastructure as the BGs. For example, one replica of the CM can be hosted in each BG as
long as the total number of BGs is at least 3f + 1 where f is an upper bound on the number of simultaneous
replica failures.
More concretely, the CM service is a collection of CM nodes, each comprising an RSM replica for fault-
tolerant distributed coordination, and a remote procedure call (RPC) server for interaction with BGs. The
RPC server is able to read the state of the RSM replica, but cannot write it directly. State changes are
instead accomplished by submitting commands from the service handler of the RPC server to the RSM by
way of the co-located RSM replica.
One of the difficulties with using replicated state machines and consensus in a Byzantine environment
is that Byzantine processes can in some cases propose invalid commands or inputs. That is, even though
agreement is guaranteed on some decision or sequence of decisions, these decisions themselves may be invalid
because they are based on erroneous or malicious inputs. We deal with this issue using a combination of
techniques that ensure the following guarantees with respect to decisions made using the intra-BG BFT
consensus and the CM replicated state machine:
1. Integrity: each decision was agreed to by a sufficiently large quorum of processes (i.e., a supermajority).
2. Validity: each decision is consistent with the protocol, regardless of whether it was proposed by an
honest node or a Byzantine node.
The correctness properties are ensured using various forms of certificates, which typically contain a collection
of signatures from quorum of f + 1 nodes. Details are provided in Section A.3.
We begin by describing a simplified version of the protocol in which the BGs communicate with the CM
(i.e., with the local CM node) when they approach the end of round 3 of every consensus cycle. Specifically,
this occurs when the BG has received inputs from 2f + 1 BGs including itself, and has either received inputs
from or timed out on the remaining f BGs. Each BG sends a BG REPORT message to all the CM replicas
indicating the set of other BGs from which transactions were successfully received up to this point in the
current cycle, as well as a hash of the transactions for each peer BG.
For each cycle, a CM node waits until it has received BG REPORT messages from 2f + 1 of the BGs, and
then waits further until each remaining BG either sends its message, or is suspected to have failed due to a
timeout.13 Suspicions of failure are corroborated by other CM nodes as follows to prevent false alarms by
Byzantine nodes: failure is declared when a quorum of f + 1 CM nodes all suspect (i.e., have timed out on)
a particular BG. Messages relaying failure suspicion are signed by CM nodes and contain both the BG’s ID
and the cycle number to prevent replay attacks. A collection of f+1 such signatures from distinct CM nodes
for the same BG and cycle number comprise a failure certificate. If a failure certificate cannot be computed
for some BG, then the CM node eventually receives a BG REPORT for that BG indirectly from some other
CM node.
As a running example, consider the case of three BGs: BG1, BG2, and BG3. Suppose that BG1 in
cycle C1 receives inputs from BG2 and BG3. If BG2 becomes unreachable in cycle C1 with respect to BG3
13In this case “failed” means unreachable rather than crashed.
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and the CM, then the CM node might receive the following two BG REPORT messages from BG1 and BG3,
respectively:
[C1, BG1:hash1, {BG2:hash2, BG3:hash3}]
[C1, BG3:hash3, {BG1:hash1}]
The BG REPORT is called complete in the first case, indicating that the BG has received transaction inputs
from all BGs, and incomplete otherwise.
Suppose that a CM node eventually computes a failure certificate for BG2, and creates a graph repre-
sentation of cycle C1 as shown in Figure 2. The vertices of the graph represent BGs and the edges indicate
that one BG has a copy of another BG’s transactions. The direction of the edge is from the BG that issued
the transactions to the BG that received a copy of the transactions.
BG1
BG2BG3
Figure 2: Graph representation of CM’s inputs for cycle C1.
Next, the CM node computes the outcome of C1 using a configurable policy. In one variation, it computes
a maximum subset of vertices with out-degree greater than or equal to N − 1, where N is the total number
of non-failed vertices (i.e., vertices representing live BGs). Such vertices represent proposals that are fully
replicated across all non-failed BGs. For C1, N = 2 because BG2 is unavailable, which is indicated in Figure 2
using a dotted circle around BG2. Any such vertex is implicitly excluded from the computation, along with
any edges incident on it. The outcome of the CM’s graph analysis in C1 is therefore the maximum subset of
non-failed vertices with in-degree one: {BG1, BG3}. The remaining BG, namely BG2, is then added to the
set of faulty nodes (FN) for cycle C1. This means that BG2’s inputs are excluded from C1, and does not
imply BG2’s deletion from the group membership of the system. Next, the CM node proposes a command to
the RSM that associates two records with cycle C1: the mapping {BG1:hash1, BG3:hash3} representing the
collection of transactions committed in cycle C1, and the mapping FN = {BG2:failcert2} representing the
BGs deemed to have failed and their failure certificates. Each CM node eventually receives the command,
and is able to report to its own BG the outcome of cycle C1. The CM node finally delivers to the BG a
CM REPLY message that contains the command and corresponding certificate (see Section A.3). A BG that
receives such a message from the local CM node will stop waiting for any BG in FN, and continues to contact
other BGs to retrieve any missing transaction inputs.
The graph analysis is performed in parallel by different CM nodes for each cycle, and this may lead
to differing views on the liveness of a particular BG, hence to different outputs. The certification scheme
described in Section A.3 ensures that the decision of the CM is well-defined for each cycle despite this.
Specifically, in the event that multiple decisions are committed in the CM RSM, the first state transition is
treated as authoritative and the others are ignored. Duplicate decisions should nevertheless be avoided in
the interest of performance, and several optimizations can be used for this purpose:
• The CM nodes submit a command to the RSM for cycle C only if they have not yet executed a state
transition command for C.
• Randomized timeouts can be used prior to submitting an RSM command.
• A distinguished leader CM node can be responsible for submitting the RSM command, in which case
duplicate state transitions for the same cycle would occur only if the leader suffers a Byzantine failure
or if two leaders exist temporarily because of inaccurate failure detection. A RAFT-style term-based
leader election algorithm can be used in this context with extensions for Byzantine fault tolerance (e.g.,
a node cannot start leader election until is has computed a failure certificate for the current leader).
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Now suppose that BG2 was merely slow and not faulty, and continues to participate in the next cycle
C2. Since BG2 is added to FN specifically for cycle C1, BG1 and BG3 continue to attempt communication
with BG2 in cycle C2.14 The CM node may therefore receive the following messages in C2:
[C2, BG1:hash1, {BG2:hash2, BG3:hash3}]
[C2, BG2:hash2, {BG1:hash1, BG3:hash3}]
[C2, BG3:hash3, {BG1:hash1, BG2:hash2}]
Figure 3 shows the corresponding graph computed by the CM. The outcome of the graph computation for C2
is different from C1 because BG2 participates fully. The CM node then associates {BG1:hash1, BG2:hash2,
BG3:hash3} and FN = {} with cycle C2 by issuing a command to the RSM.
BG1
BG2BG3
Figure 3: Graph representation of CM’s inputs for cycle C2.
Next, the CM may receive the following messages in cycle C3 if BG2 is removed from the BG by the
administrator in cycle C2:
[C3, BG1:hash1, {BG3:hash3}]
[C3, BG3:hash3, {BG1:hash1}]
Figure 4 shows the corresponding graph computed by the CM. The CM then associates {BG1:hash1,
BG3:hash3} and FN = {} with cycle C3 by issuing a command to the RSM, similarly to cycles C1 and
C2.
BG1
BG3
Figure 4: Graph representations of CM’s inputs for cycle C3.
Next, suppose that BG2 comes back as BG4 in cycle C4. Then in cycle C4 the CM may receive the
following messages:
[C4, BG1:hash1, {BG3:hash3, BG4:hash3}]
[C4, BG3:hash3, {BG1:hash1, BG2:hash2}]
[C4, BG4:hash4, {BG1:hash1, BG3:hash3}]
This scenario indicates a return to steady state operation in which each BG is able to communicate with
every other BG. Then the CM computes the graph shown in Figure 5 and associates {BG1:hash1, BG3:hash3,
BG4:hash4} and FN = {} with cycle C4 using the RSM since all vertices have out-degree two.
In the running example above, the output of the RCanopus protocol for a given cycle is determined by
the set of nodes recorded in the CM RSM. For cycles C2 and C4, the output is the union of the inputs of all
the BGs in the system. For C1 and C3, the output is the union of the inputs of BG1 and BG3 only.
14An optimization that avoids this is described later on in Section A.2.
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BG1
BG4BG3
Figure 5: Graph representations of CM’s inputs for cycle C4.
In a variation of the protocol, the graph analysis selects vertices whose out-degree is sufficient to achieve
an administrator-defined replication factor R. For example, to ensure a replication factor of at least R under
the assumption that a BG never crashes permanently, the CM would select a maximal subset of vertices
with out-degree at least R − 1. (We assume that a BG stores its own inputs, hence only R − 1 additional
copies are required at other BGs.) In this optimized version of the protocol, the CM may associate additional
information with each consensus cycle to identify the BGs that hold copies on the transaction inputs that
constitute the output.
To summarize, the CM uses communication successes in a cycle, along with a graph algorithm, to
determine the set of BGs that can be considered live for the cycle. This information is broadcast to all
the BGs, who then exclude transactions from any BGs that were identified by the CM as failed (meaning
unavailable). The cycle completes only at this point. Section A.1 discusses how the CM can be removed
from the critical path in failure-free operation.
A.1 Bypassing the CM in the absence of failures
In the interest of performance, the BGs must avoid coordinating with the CM in every cycle in the common
case of failure-free operation. The protocol can be modified to remove the CM from the critical path in this
case, and invoked only when needed to settle the outcome of a consensus cycle that is affected by a failure.
Letting k denote the depth of the processing pipeline, this is accomplished by having each BG broadcast
meta-data related to the outcome of cycle C to the other BGs as part of its input in cycle C + k, which
begins only after cycle C completes.15 At the completion of cycle C + k, each BG can retroactively analyze
the meta-data received for cycle C to classify this cycle as belonging to one of two disjoint categories:
1. A CM-assisted cycle is one where at least one BG received assistance from the CM, in which case the
outcome of the cycle is decided explicitly by the CM.16
2. A cycle is unassisted otherwise, in which case its outcome is the union of the inputs of all the BGs in
the system.
We say that the commitment of cycle C is delayed by k cycles because the outcome of cycle C is not known
until the end of cycle C + k.
As hinted earlier, the protocol is modified by including meta-data regarding cycle C in the input for
cycle C + k. The meta-data is packaged as a BG META message indicating whether or not this BG received
assistance from the CM in cycle C. The BG META message comes in three flavors:
1. A BG META-NO ASST message indicates that the BG decided not to seek assistance from the CM, and
hence did not receive assistance.
2. A BG META-ASSISTED message indicates that the BG sought and received assistance from the CM.
3. A BG META-DENIED message indicates that the BG sought assistance from the CM and was denied
because its request came too late (i.e., at a time when the CM had already begun assisting some BG
with a later cycle). This case is discussed in more detail shortly.
15This optimization requires that a BG participate for one additional cycle after it is deleted from the system’s group
membership. In particular, a BG that is deleted in cycle C must still offer its meta-data (but no transactions) in cycle C + k
before disengaging entirely from the protocol.
16“Received assistance” means that a BG reported to the CM that it is stalled on another peer BG, and was told the outcome
of the cycle by the CM.
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To ensure a correct categorization of cycles, the meta-data reported by BGs must be in agreement with
the state of the CM meaning that the cycle is CM-assisted if and only if at least one BG generates a
BG META-ASSISTED. To that end, BGs must follow certain rules:
1. The decision of a BG to seek (or not seek) assistance from the CM is committed in a Byzantine fault
tolerant manner and certified using the techniques described in Section A.3. For performance, this
decision can be combined with consensus on the BG’s input for some future cycle (e.g., cycle C + k).
The certificate corresponding to this decision is attached to the BG META message.
2. Once a BG records a decision to seek assistance, it cannot complete the cycle without submitting a
request to the CM and receiving a response. The request message is an incomplete BG REPORT. The
response message is either a CM REPLY, which was discussed earlier, or a CM DENY, which is explained
shortly.
3. A CM REPLY message is attached to a BG META-ASSISTED meta-data message to prove that a BG received
assistance. Similarly, a CM DENY message is attached to a BG META-DENIED meta-data message to prove
that a BG was denied. The certification scheme discussed in Section A.3 ensures that a BG can only
obtain either a CM REPLY or CM DENY for a given cycle, and not both.
As an example, suppose that there are three BGs – BG1, BG2, BG3 – in a system with a pipeline of
depth k = 1. Suppose further that the proposals of these three BGs are exchanged successfully in cycle C1
without the CM’s assistance. Then each BG adds a BG META-NO ASST message to its input for cycle C2.
At the end of cycle C2, presuming no failures, each BG computes the following mapping from BGs to their
meta-data:
C1: {BG1 → BG META-NO ASST, BG2 → BG META-NO ASST, BG3 → BG META-NO ASST}
The number of keys in this mapping (three), and the fact that all values are BG META-NO ASST, indicate
collectively that cycle C1 was unassisted. All BGs know this once C2 is complete because in this case all
BGs receive meta-data from all other BGs.
Next, consider a failure scenario in which BG1 is unable to receive data from BG2 in cycle C3, and
requests (as well as receives) assistance from the CM in cycle C3. Then BG1 includes a BG META-ASSISTED
message in its input to cycle C4. The outcome of cycle C4 depends on the meta-data received by a given
BG at the end of cycle C4. If all the meta-data messages are BG META-NO ASST or BG META-DENIED, then C3
is unassisted (not the case in this example). If at least one meta-data message is a BG META-ASSISTED then
C3 is CM-assisted. For example, this occurs in the current example if a BG computes the following mapping
for C3:
C3: {BG1 → BG META-ASSISTED, BG2 → BG META-NO ASST, BG3 → BG META-NO ASST}
The same case applies if a BG computes a subset of this mapping as follows:
C3: {BG1 → BG META-ASSISTED, BG2 → BG META-NO ASST}
Finally, if there is one or more missing meta-data message, and no BG META-ASSISTED is received, then further
investigation is required to resolve the outcome of the cycle. For example, this occurs if a BG computes the
following mapping for C3 in C4:
C3: {BG2 → BG META-NO ASST, BG3 → BG META-NO ASST}
In this case cycle C4 itself is CM-assisted because the input of BG1 for C4 is not received by the BG that
computes the above mapping, and so the status of C3 (i.e., assisted vs. unassisted) is known already to
the CM provided that it maintains the following invariant: the CM cannot assist with cycle C if it has
already begun assisting with cycle C + k where k is the depth of the pipeline. Maintaining this invariant
ensures that the CM can be queried directly to determine the outcome of C3 once C4 is known to be CM-
assisted. Enforcing the above invariant is difficult as it leads to a race condition in which a slow BG requests
assistance for an earlier cycle C once the CM has already started assisting a later cycle C ′. A CM node
deals with this race condition as follows: before replying to any request for assistance with C ′, it ensures
that a supermajority of BGs have progressed past cycle C after either receiving assistance from the CM or
receiving transaction inputs from all other BGs in cycle C. More concretely, the CM waits until it either has
a complete BG REPORT for cycle C from a supermajority of BGs, or else until some BG issues an incomplete
BG REPORT for cycle C, indicating a request for assistance. In the latter case the CM offers assistance by
returning a CM REPLY message. Any request for assistance (i.e., incomplete BG REPORT) with cycle C received
after this point is replied to with a precomputed CM REPLY if C was CM-assisted, and with a CM DENY message
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otherwise. The denial message indicates to the requesting BG that C is unassisted and any missing inputs
can be obtained by querying any supermajority quorum of BGs.
Theorem 2 (safety). If two BGs determine the outcome of a cycle C then either both decide that C is
CM-assisted or both decide that C is unassisted.
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that two BGs, say BG1 and BG2, reach conflicting decisions regarding
cycle C. Suppose that BG1 decides that C is CM-assisted, and BG2 decides that C is unassisted. Since
BG1 decides that C is CM-assisted, one of three events occurred:
(i) BG1 requested and received assistance from the CM in cycle C, and produced a BG META-ASSISTED;
or
(ii) BG1 received a BG META-ASSISTED from another BG in a later cycle; or
(iii) BG1 received incomplete meta-data for cycle C and determined that C was CM-assisted by querying
the CM directly (i.e., received a CM REPLY and not a CM DENY).
In cases (i) and (iii), it follows that BG1 reaches the correct conclusion since it communicates directly with
the CM, and since the certification scheme described in Section A.3 ensure that the CM nodes produce a
uniform decision for a given cycle. In case (ii), the BG META-ASSISTED includes a corresponding CM REPLY,
which is certified and proves that the cycle was CM-assisted.
Next, consider how BG2 reached the incorrect conclusion that C is unassisted. According to the protocol,
BG2 must have received only BG META-NO ASST and BG META-DENIED meta-data messages from all BGs in
cycle C+k, and yet one of these BGs did in fact receive assistance in cycle C (i.e., was offered a CM REPLY for
cycle C). A BG META-NO ASST includes a certificate that proves the BG committed not to seek assistance from
the CM in cycle C. On the other hand, a BG META-DENIED includes a CM DENY message, which proves that
the cycle was unassisted. Both cases contradict the observation that the BG under consideration received
assistance from the CM in cycle C.
Theorem 3 (liveness). Suppose that the protocol begins to process cycle C and that the pipeline depth is
k. Suppose further that each BG individually maintains safety and liveness. If there exists a quorum Q of
at least 2f + 1 BGs that are able to exchange and process messages sufficiently quickly to avoid triggering
timeouts in the protocol, then eventually every BG in q progresses to a cycle C ≥ C + k.
Proof. The protocol begins with each BG collecting inputs from peer BGs. Every BG in Q is able to receive
such inputs from all other BGs in Q, and then either receives inputs from or times out on every BG outside
of Q. If the BG receives inputs from all BGs then it proceeds directly to cycle C+k with a BG META-NO ASST
meta-data message for cycle C, and the theorem holds. On the other hand, if any of the inputs is missing
then the BG requests assistance from the CM by sending a BG REPORT message to its local CM node. (This
case can be avoided if an unavailable BG is excluded by the CM for cycle C while assisting with some earlier
cycle, or temporarily removed from the group by the administrator.) At this point the CM node follows one
of several execution paths.
Case A: the CM node has already computed a CM REPLY or CM DENY for cycle C. Then the CM node
returns the same response to the BG under consideration.
Case B: the CM node has not yet computed a CM REPLY or CM DENY for cycle C. In this case the CM node
first ensures that the outcome of cycle C − k has been determined, which involves contacting a quorum of
2f+1 BGs, analyzing their BG REPORT messages, and in some cases computing one or more failure certificates.
Timely communication with BGS and corresponding CM nodes in Q ensures that this part of the protocol
completes eventually. Next, the CM node either attempts to assist the BG, or replies with a denial if it has
already computed a certified CM REPLY (i.e., provided assistance) for cycle C + k or higher.
Subcase B1: the CM node has already computed a certified CM REPLY for cycle C + k or higher. Then
the CM node replies to the BG with a CM REPLY message if such a message has been processed by the RSM
and certified for cycle C, or else it replies with a CM DENY message, which is also be certified. In the former
case, the reply to the BG is pre-computed. In the latter case, the CM DENY command can be certified using
the CM nodes corresponding to Q.
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Subcase B2: the CM node has not yet computed a CM REPLY for cycle C + k or higher. Then the CM
node proceeds with graph analysis based on the inputs of the BGs in Q and possibly other BGs outside of
Q. Every BG in Q reports its BG REPORT to the CM node, and for every BG outside of Q, either a failure
certificate is computed by 2f + 1 CM nodes, or a BG REPORT message is retrieved for cycle C. Next, the
CM node proposes a command to its RSM based on the computed CM REPLY. This command is accepted by
the RSM, particularly the CM nodes corresponding to the BGs in Q, but there is no guarantee that it will
be certified because a conflicting command for cycle C may have a already been proposed. If the command
is certified successfully, then the CM node returns a certified CM REPLY response to the BG. Otherwise the
CM node discovers that either a CM REPLY message was already processed for cycle C or for cycle C + k or
higher in an earlier RSM command, and was successfully certified. In the former case, the CM node replies
with the earlier CM REPLY command after ensuring that the command is certified. In the latter case, the CM
replies with a CM DENY message to the BG.
A.2 Optimization for long network partitions
A network partition may cause some BGs to lose contact with other BGs in the system for an extended
period of time. The CM bypass mechanism, as described earlier, is ineffective during such a partition because
every cycle must be CM-assisted, which introduces a substantial performance overhead. The problem can
be remedied by excluding the inputs of BGs selected in the graph analysis for multiple consensus cycles.
That is, in a CM-assisted cycle C, the decision to exclude the inputs of some BG persists beyond cycle C
for one or more additional cycles starting at C + k, where k is the depth of the pipeline. The additional
information regarding excluded BGs can be embedded in the CM REPLY message, which is attached to the
BG META-ASSISTED messages in the CM bypass mechanism. An excluded BG resumes computation later on
without having to change its ID and execute a join protocol. Peer BGs continue to send messages to the
excluded BG until then, but do not expect replies. Alternatively, a temporary group membership change
can be made using the same mechanism as for ordinary group membership, which remains available from
inside a sufficiently large partition (i.e., as long as a supermajority of BGs can be reached).
A.3 Certification of consensus decisions
This section pertains to two types of decisions:
1. The BG’s choice of transaction inputs for a given consensus cycle, which may include some meta-data
regarding a past cycle (see Section A.1).
2. The CM’s decision on the outcome of a cycle, which is based on graph analysis.
Since both decisions are reached using a black box BFT consensus, it is possible to ensure integrity by
computing a quorum certificate for a decision – a collection of signatures from a supermajority (2f + 1)
quorum of servers. However, the quorum certificate created in an application-agnostic manner inside the
BFT black box does not by itself ensure validity in a Byzantine environment. This is because an invalid
decision may be committed based on the input of a Byzantine node. Worse yet, multiple conflicting decisions
may be committed.
One solution to the problem is to modify the implementation of the BFT consensus and filter out both
invalid and duplicate decisions before they are committed. In this case a conventional quorum certificate is
sufficient to ensure both integrity and validity. If the BFT implementation cannot be modified, for example
because it is closed source or managed by a third party provider, then We solve the problem by applying
additional signatures on top of the quorum certificate that attest to the fact that the decision is singular and
intended by the protocol. The number of additional signatures must be sufficient to ensure that at least one
signature comes from an honest node (i.e., at least f + 1). This node must be aware of all prior decisions
reached by the BFT consensus so that it can detect invalid or duplicate decisions. An invalid decision must
not be signed, and only the first decision in a sequence of duplicate decisions may be signed.
Example: A representative from a BG proposes that the BG’s transaction input in the inter-BG layer
for some cycle C is a set S. A second representative proposes a different set S′ (e.g., same transactions but
different meta-data for an earlier cycle in the CM bypass optimization). An honest server proposes S to the
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intra-BG BFT consensus, and a Byzantine node subsequently proposes S′. The BFT records both decisions
– S followed by S′. The additional signatures will ensure that S is identified correctly as the BG’s input for
cycle C. If the quorum certificates produced for S and S′ include the index number of the corresponding
decision, then any honest node identifies S as the first valid decision computed by the BFT consensus for
cycle C, signs S, and refuses to sign S′.
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